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Abstract
 Basel II, a major international regulatory capital revision, 
was supposed to have been implemented in the U.S. by 2004, 
but delays pushed it back more than five years. Basel II could 
have lowered minimum capital standards and made the largest 
banks even more vulnerable to the subprime financial crisis and 
economic downturn had it been adopted before its onset in 2007. 
Consequently, the procrastination in implementing Basel II made 
the banking industry more stable as it entered the financial crisis. 
In this study, the assets of the 11 largest bank holding companies 
at year-end 2006 were separated into broad asset classes with 
similar default characteristics as set forth under the second Basel 
Accord. The hypothetical capital to be held by the BHCs against 
their loans and leases was computed as required under Basel II 
and compared with the actual capital the banks held at year-end 
2006. Based on these computations, it appears that Basel II would 
have made banks even more vulnerable to the financial crisis 
had it been adopted earlier. Consequently, the procrastination in 
implementing Basel II benefited both the banking industry and the 
federal government. Among the 11 bank holding companies, total 
capital could have decreased by more than $170 billion under Ba-
sel II compared to the actual capital being held. The change would 
have amounted to a 29.7% decrease in total capital and a 52.9% 
drop in capital held against loans and leases, both on a weighted-
average basis. Without question, Basel II needs to be adjusted to 
be more conservative. 
Overview of the Basel Accords
 Capital provides a firm with a buffer to absorb losses. All 
other factors being equal, more capital reduces the likelihood of 
failure because shareholders bear the losses, and, unlike bond-
holders, shareholders have no legal claim to recoup their equity 
investment. However, equity is expensive because shareholders 
require relatively high rates of return given their first-loss position. 
Consequently, most firms would prefer to finance their operations 
with a mixture of debt and equity. An important strategic decision 
for any firm is to determine the optimal level of capital. As a firm’s 
level of equity increases, investors are willing to purchase the 
firm’s debt at relatively low interest rates. In unregulated markets, 
a firm will choose a capital level that balances the high cost of cap-
ital with the lower cost of debt issuance to achieve a low overall 
cost of capital. Banks, however, operate in regulated markets. 
 Following the wave of bank failures during the Great Depres-
sion, Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
to insure domestic deposits. Deposit insurance provides banks with 
incentives to reduce capital and increase debt (including deposits) 
because insured depositors are willing to lend their funds to banks 
at risk-free rates of return regardless of the bank’s level of capital. 
Since the market cannot effectively discipline banks’ incentives to 
hold an appropriate amount of capital, bank regulators must step in 
to ensure that minimum capital levels are held. The Basel Capital 
Accord is a regulatory framework that establishes minimum capi-
tal holdings for banking organizations.
 Basel I, drafted in 1988 and implemented in the US in 1992, 
was the first international accord to set uniform, international 
capital standards (BIS, 2003.) The innovation of Basel I was to 
adjust minimum capital requirements for a bank’s credit risk. Over 
time, however, Basel I was criticized by the industry as being too 
insensitive to a bank’s true credit risks. In the late 1990s, develop-
ment of Basel II was begun to help better align bank risk and the 
capital held at each bank. 
 Although Basel II contains three methods for determining 
capital requirements, the United States has adopted only the most 
complex method, called the advanced measurement approach 
(AMA). Even then, only the very largest banks—perhaps the larg-
est dozen—will implement Basel II. The other 7,000+ banks will 
continue to operate under Basel I. Basel II has drawn criticism 
from some regulators and analysts for two primary reasons. First, 
as Emmons, Lskavyan, and Yeager (2005) argue, the different 
methods of computing minimum capital requirements can result in 
giving Basel II banks a competitive advantage over Basel I banks. 
Second, Basel II may exacerbate economic business cycles be-
cause it requires relatively small amounts of capital during booms 
and large amounts of capital during recessions.
 The competitive advantage issue between Basel I and Basel II 
can be shown by comparing the capital requirements for a generic 
$200,000 retail mortgage loan. Under Basel I, all retail mortgages 
are put into the 50% risk weight bracket. The current economic 
conditions or the creditworthiness of the borrower has no bearing 
on this determination of risk. The risk-weighted assets for the loan 
would be $100,000, derived by multiplying the risk weight by the 
value of the loan. Basel I specifies that banks hold a minimum of 
8% of risk-weighted assets in the form of capital; therefore, the 
minimum required capital for the loan would be $8,000. 
 Basel II places emphasis on the bank’s internal assessment of 
risk instead of assigning loans to predetermined buckets with arbi-
trary risk weights (BIS, 2005.) The necessary capital under Basel 
II requires internal estimates of the probability of default (PD), 
loss given default (LGD), and the correlation factor (R), which is 
discussed in greater detail later. As an example, let’s assume that 
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PD, LGD, and R equal 1.17%, 20.3%, and 0.15, respectively. To 
determine the loan’s required capital percentage, the bank would 
put the variables into the following formula provided by the regu-
lators:
 Capital requirement (K) =  LGD × N [(1 - R) ^ -0.5 × G  
 (PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G (0.999)] - PD x LGD
By doing so, the bank would compute the capital requirement for 
the residential mortgage under Basel II to be $4,516 or 2.26% of 
the value of the loan.
 This simple comparison of the required capital for the same 
loan under Basel I and Basel II illustrates the possible competitive 
advantage for banks operating under Basel II. If a bank can fund 
a loan with less equity, its overall cost of capital is lower, which 
potentially allows it to lend at lower interest rates and take away 
business from other banks. Calem and Follain (2007) performed 
some benchmark calculations that suggested a significant potential 
shift of market share and income to the largest banking institutions 
in the mortgage market. In addition, Berger (2006) studied the 
likely competitive effects of the implementation of Basel II capital 
requirements on U.S. banks in the market for credit to small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). He found only relatively minor com-
petitive effects on most community banks because the large Basel 
II adopters tend to make very different types of SME loans to dif-
ferent types of borrowers than community banks. However, there 
may be significant adverse effects on the competitive positions of 
large Basel I banking organizations.
 A second concern with the Basel II framework is that it is 
procyclical, encouraging banks to hold less capital during periods 
of economic growth and more capital during recessionary periods. 
Kashyap and Stein (2004, p. 28) write that “our simulations sug-
gest that the new Basel II capital requirements have the potential 
to create an amount of additional cyclicality in capital charges that 
is, at a minimum, economically significant, and that may be—de-
pending on a bank’s customer mix and the credit-risk models that 
it uses—quite large.” Gordy and Howells (2006) argue that the 
“new capital standards will exacerbate business cycle fluctuations. 
In brief, the idea is that, in a downturn when a bank’s capital base 
is likely being eroded by loan losses, its existing (non-defaulted) 
borrowers will be downgraded by the relevant credit-risk models, 
forcing the bank to hold more capital against its current loan port-
folio. To the extent that it is difficult or costly for the bank to raise 
fresh external capital in bad times, it will be forced to cut back 
on its lending activity, thereby contributing to a worsening of the 
initial downturn.
Research Question
 This paper addresses the cyclicality of Basel II by estimating 
the potential reduction in capital requirements for banks adopting 
Basel II had the new framework been adopted just before the onset 
of the financial crisis in 2007. The AMA approach enables banks 
to use internal estimates to determine minimum capital require-
ments, and the default probability of a loan is a key estimated 
input. If banks underestimate “true” default probabilities, they may 
end up holding less capital than necessary. For example, mort-
gages and mortgage-backed securities had historically low default 
probabilities prior to the recent financial crisis. Due to their history 
of low default risk and high credit ratings, it could be hypothesized 
that, under Basel II, most banks would have held lower capital 
against their mortgages and mortgage-backed securities than they 
held under Basel I. Consequently, during the surge of sub-prime 
residential lending, large quantities of these securities would not 
have been properly assessed for their credit risk. 
 Thus the research question is, would Basel II have lowered 
minimum capital standards and made banks even more vulnerable 
to the financial crisis had it been adopted before the onset of the 
crisis? If so, the procrastination in implementing Basel II made the 
banking industry more stable as it entered the financial crisis.
Research Methodology
 In determining the Bank Holding Companies (BHC) to 
include in this sample, the 11 largest banks were selected accord-
ing to total assets as of December 31, 2006, the period of time just 
before the onset of the crisis. Implementing the Basel II Accord 
requires more time and effort from the BHCs; therefore, it would 
have been adopted by only a select number of the largest institu-
tions as determined by the United States regulators. The bank 
holding companies used in this research are shown in Table 1:
 The next step was to find the account values for all of the 
loans and leases at each of the BHCs so that these values could 
be mapped into the Basel II capital formula. These loan numbers 
can be located in Schedule HC-C, Loans and Lease Financing 
Receivables in the FR Y-9C filings, which are the report forms on 
the consolidated financial statements to be filed by bank holding 
companies with total consolidated assets of $500 million or more. 
The Schedule HC-C shows the full breakdown of the company’s 
loans and leases on their balance sheets. The main categories 
include real estate loans, loans to financial institutions, commercial 
and industrial loans, loans to individuals, and other loans. 1 
 Next, loans and leases as reported in FR Y-9C were converted 
to the classification system used in the Basel II Accord. Under the 
Internal Ratings Based approach to Basel II, banks must allocate 
Bank Holding Company Total Assets 
 000,813,488,1 .cnI ,puorgitiC
Bank of America Corporation 1,463,685,485 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1,351,520,000 
 000,121,707 noitaroproC aivohcaW
Wells Fargo & Company 481,996,000 
HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. 478,025,477 
 000,568,134 noitaroproC sunuaT
 297,111,162 .cnI ,SU puorG syalcraB
 000,232,912 procnaB SU
Countrywide Financial Corporation 199,946,230 
 906,161,281 .cnI sknaB tsurTnuS
Table 1.  Bank Holding Company Total Assets As of December 31, 2006 ($000s)
1The schedule also allocates account balances as domestic and/or consolidated. In order to obtain the individual account balances for all real estate 
loans, I had to solve for foreign real estate holdings. The foreign real estate was only included in the total consolidated figure for real estate loans. 
Therefore, foreign real estate can only be found using the total consolidated loans secured by real estate and subtracting the sum of all loans secured by 
real estate in domestic offices. This process allows the total loan values to equal the BHCs’ total consolidated loans and leases as reported.
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their exposures into different classes of assets with different un-
derlying risk characteristics. Unlike the classification system used 
for loans in the FR Y9-C reports, loans and leases made accord-
ing to Basel II are categorized by five main groupings: corporate, 
sovereign, bank, retail, and equity. Beyond the five main classes, 
the corporate asset class is divided into five sub-classes, and the 
retail asset class is separated into three separate sub-classes. The 
FR Y9-C loan categories can be mapped into the following eight 
Basel II categories: 
 Retail Mortgage:
 3 Revolving, open-end loans secured by 1-4 family residential 
  properties and extended under lines of credit
	 3 Closed-end loans secured by 1-4 family residential  
  properties
 Qualified Revolving Retail Exposures:
	 3 Credit card and other revolving credit plans
 Small and Medium Enterprise Retail:
	 3 Loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to  
  farmers
	 3 Lease financing receivables
 Other Retail:
	 3 Other consumer loans including single payment,  
  installment, and all student loans
 Wholesale Corporate:
	 3 Commercial and industrial to U.S. and non-U.S. addresses  
 (domicile)
 Wholesale Bank:
	 3 Loans to U.S. banks and other U.S. depository institutions
	 3 Loans for purchasing and carrying securities
	 3 Loans to foreign banks
	 3 All other loans to financial institutions
 Wholesale Sovereign: 
	 3 Loans to foreign governments and official institutions
 Small and Medium Enterprise Corporate:
	 3 Construction, land development, and other land loans
	 3 Commercial real estate loans secured by non-farm non- 
  residential properties, multifamily residential properties, or  
  farmland
	 3 Foreign real estate holdings
 The next step was to determine the estimates for the three 
main variables in the required capital formula under Basel II: the 
probability of default, the loss given default, and the exposure at 
default. Probability of default is the chance that a given loan will 
enter into default before it reaches maturity expressed in the form 
of a percentage. Loss given default is defined as the portion of the 
initial loan balance that will not be recovered if the borrower de-
faults on the loan. To correctly calculate the probability of default 
for the different asset classes requires knowledge of the number of 
loans that went into default for the given period and prior periods 
compared to the total number of loans outstanding of a given type. 
Unfortunately, all of the financial statement data on the FRY-9C 
forms are account balance totals. No information is provided on 
individual loans. 
 Fortunately, the Fifth Quantitative Impact Study conducted 
by the Bank for International Settlements on 382 banks worldwide 
estimates the PD and LGD for each sample BHC (BIS, 2006.) 
This impact study was the last trial run of Basel II to evaluate the 
potential changes in the minimum required capital levels under 
Basel II; thus, it contains the most recent changes proposed to the 
accord in June of 2004 prior to its delay because of the economic 
crisis. The appropriate data to use were those from the weighted-
average estimates of PD and LGD across all eight asset classes of 
the G10 Group 1 because of its relevance to the 11 banks chosen 
for this study. Exposure at default (EAD) was set at the total value 
of the loans and leases for each of the asset classes. The estimates 
of PD and LGD gathered from the Fifth Quantitative Impact Study 
were used for each of the 11 BHCs in the sample and are shown in 
Table 2.
 A key determinant of the riskiness of an asset is its sensitivity 
to adverse economic events. The formula for calculating required 
minimum capital for Basel II requires a systemic correlation factor 
which measures the relationship between different types of loans 
and some unspecified adverse event. For instance, imagine that a 
bank has two loans outstanding with a value of $50,000 each. The 
first loan is to a blue-collar worker with no savings, and the second 
is to a local businessman with a large net worth. If the economy 
turns for the worse, the blue-collar worker is more likely to lose 
his job and be forced to default on the loan despite all attempts to 
pay it off. Although still affected by the economic downturn, the 
local business person is more likely to repay the loan. 
 This sensitivity to outside factors could also be based on the 
type of asset or other factors. While the formula for the systematic 
correlation factor is similar for all bank exposures, the ranges of 
correlations differ between retail and non-retail exposures. For 
corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures, the maximum and mini-
mum correlations are set at 0.24 and 0.12, respectively. However, 
for retail exposures, the systematic correlation factors range from 
0.03 to 0.16. For results between the maximum and the minimum, 
the correlation for each asset class differs because of the use of 
the historical average probability of default as the sole input in the 
formula. The higher the average probability of default, the lower 
its systematic correlation will be, and vice versa. For example, if 
a loan has an extremely high probability of default, the external 
factors cannot increase the chances for default much higher than 
they already are; therefore, the correlation factor will be lower. 
For retail mortgages and qualifying revolving retail exposures, the 
correlation factors are given as 0.15 and 0.04, respectively, without 
the use of a formula.
Correlation (R) for corporate, soverigh, or bank exposure   = 
 0.12 × (1 – EXP (-50 × PD)) / (1 – EXP (-50)) + 0.24 × [1 - (1  
 – EXP (-50 × PD)) / (1 – EXP (-50))]
Correlation (R) for retail exposure  =  
 0.03 × (1 – EXP (-35 × PD)) / (1 – EXP (-35)) +0.16 × [1 - (1  
 – EXP (-35 × PD)) / (1 – EXP (-35))]
 liateR  
Retail Mortgage 
Qualifying Revolving 
Exposure
Other 
Small and Medium 
Enterprise 
Loss Given Default (LGD) 20.3% 71.6% 48.0% 46.2% 
Probability of Default (PD) 1.17% 2.95% 3.45% 2.99% 
 elaselohW  
Corporate Bank Sovereign 
SME  
Corporate
Loss Given Default (LGD) 39.8% 40.9% 33.3% 35.0% 
Probability of Default (PD) 0.99% 0.27% 0.12% 2.10% 
Table 2.  Estimates of PD and LGD for G10 Group 1 Banks from QIS5
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 The final components in capital formula for non-retail ex-
posures are the maturity adjustment and average maturity. The 
weighted-average maturity of all loans except the residential 
mortgage loans were obtained from Schedule RC-C of the Federal 
call reports for each of the BHCs. The problem is that call reports 
are done on the bank level and not by the bank holding company. 
Consequently, each BHC was matched with its national- and state-
chartered banks. Schedule RC-C of the call report divides residen-
tial mortgages and other mortgages into the following maturity 
brackets: three months or less, three months to a year, one to three 
years, three to five years, five to fifteen years, and over fifteen 
years. A weighted-average formula was then created to compute 
the average remaining maturity of non-residential mortgages to be 
used in the maturity adjustment, which only applies to non-retail 
exposures. The formula used the median of each of the maturity 
brackets times the value of the loans in that bracket. The next step 
was to take the sum of the brackets and divide that value by the 
sum of all of the brackets to end up with the weighted-average 
maturity of all loans for that type. Under Basel II, the maturity 
adjustment is calculated using the following formula:
 Maturity adjustment (b) = (0.11852 – 0.05478 × ln (PD)) ^2
 Last, the required minimum capital ratio for each BHC was 
determined by using the formula and these inputs: PD, LGD, 
EAD, correlation factor, maturity adjustment, and average ma-
turity. As a reminder, the maturity portion of the formula is only 
used for corporate, bank, and sovereign bank exposures.
 Capital requirement (K) =  LGD × N [(1 - R) ^ -0.5 × G  
 (PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G (0.999)] - PD x LGD
 Capital requirement (K) =  [LGD × N [(1 - R) ^-0.5 × G  
 (PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × 
 w/ maturity adjustment  G (0.999)] – PD x LGD] x (1  
 - 1.5 x b) ^ -1 × (1 + (M - 2.5) × b)
 To find the actual dollar value of required capital, the required 
capital percentages were simply multiplied by the EAD to calcu-
late the actual capital required under Basel II for each loan type. 
To illustrate, the required capital calculated for a consumer loan 
is 5.5%, and the loan value is $20,000. Since EAD equals the 
value of the consumer loan, the required capital is $1,100 or 0.055 
x $20,000. Then, the required capital was totaled for each asset 
class to determine the amount of capital under Basel II based on 
previous assumptions to be held for each bank holding company. 
Remember that the required capital is only the capital to be held 
against the loans and leases of the BHCs. 
 In order to find the estimated amount of total regulatory capi-
tal, the difference between the estimated capital held against loans 
and leases and the actual capital held had to be calculated and 
then subtracted from the total regulatory capital the bank holding 
company held as of December 31, 2006, under Basel I regula-
tions. Even though the consolidated financial statements clearly 
stated the total regulatory capital held as of December 2006, the 
capital being held only against the loans and leases was needed. 
The actual risk-weighted assets held against loans and leases were 
multiplied by the total risk-based capital ratio. This allowed the 
most direct comparison between the real capital being held against 
loans and leases and the estimates resulting from the research. To 
get the actual capital held, Schedule HC-R of the FR Y9-C for the 
BHCs was used to find the total risk-based capital. The following 
demonstration shows the steps to calculate the estimated amount 
of total regulatory capital for Bank of America Corporation.
 1. Calculate the risk-weighted assets of the loans and leases
 2. Multiply the risk-weighted assets ($) by the total risk-based 
  capital ratio:
  RWA  x  TRBC = Capital LnL
  560,812,349 x 11.88% = 66,624,507
 3. Subtract the actual capital from the estimated capital held  
  against loans and leases:
  Actual Capital LnL – Estimated Capital LnL = Difference  
  Capital LnL
   $ 66,624,507  –  $ 33,334,731   =   $ 33,289,776
 4. Subtract the difference in capital for loans and leases from  
  the actual total capital:
  Actual Total Capital – Difference Capital LnL = Estimated  
  Total Capital
   $ 125,225,775  –  $ 33,289,776   =  $ 91,935,999
 In order to calculate the estimated risk-weighted assets ac-
cording to the estimate of Basel II capital derived in this study, 
the capital was divided by the total risk-based capital ratio. First, 
eight percent was used as the TRBC because it is the minimum 
level acceptable under Basel II. Next, the risk-weighted assets 
were calculated based on the risk-based capital ratio unique to 
the bank holding companies as of December 31, 2006. For all 11 
institutions, the ratios were higher than the required ratio of eight 
percent, resulting in an even lower figure for risk-weighted assets. 
 After completing the estimations of required capital and 
risk-weighted assets under the Basel II, the actual data from the 
bank holding companies for comparison were looked up. Schedule 
HC-R Regulatory Capital gives loan and lease value totals and 
allocates them to the correct risk-weight bucket. Therefore, to cal-
culate the actual risk-weighted assets for the BHCs as of Decem-
ber 31, 2006, the values for each bucket were multiplied by the 
corresponding risk weight and added together to get the total risk 
weighted assets (BIS, 2005.) However, the total reported capital 
must also be equal to the sum of loans and leases held for sale and 
loans and leases, net of unearned income, as reported in Schedule 
HC: Consolidated Balance Sheet. Hence, the same calculation was 
performed for both the loans and leases, net of unearned income, 
and the loans and leases held for sale. The need for this calcula-
tion was particularly evident when it became apparent that some 
institutions had a majority of their loans and leases classified as 
held for sale. An important note is that, even though an institution 
may be attempting to sell loans, it still controls the loans. The bank 
holding company is still required to hold the capital against the 
loans just as if they planned to hold them in portfolio.
Results 
 Based on the results of this study, Basel II would have made 
banks even more vulnerable to the financial crisis had it been 
adopted earlier. Consequently, the procrastination in implement-
ing Basel II benefited both the banking industry as a whole and 
the federal government. Among the 11 bank holding companies, 
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total capital could have decreased by more than $170 billion under 
Basel II compared to the actual capital being held. The decrease 
would have amounted to a 29.7% decrease in total capital and 
a 52.9% drop in capital held against loans and leases, both on a 
weighted-average basis. For example, Citigroup Inc., the largest 
BHC as of December 2006, held $68.1 billion in capital against 
its loans and leases. According to the calculations, Citigroup Inc. 
could have held as little as $31.3 billion in capital against its loans, 
a decrease of 54.1%. Overall, the 11 banks held $321.3 billion in 
capital against their loans and leases compared to the $151.3 bil-
lion minimum capital that was calculated under Basel II. 
 For total capital held, the differences between the actual and 
the estimates under Basel II remain the same as those from the 
capital held against loans and leases. This similarity is due to 
the fact that Basel II applies only to the calculation of required 
capital in a BHC’s loan and lease portfolio. However, the percent-
age changes in total capital still illustrate the degree to which the 
banking industry would have suffered further during the recent 
economic crisis. Wells Fargo, for example, had total capital of 
$51.5 billion at year-end 2006. Even today, banks are still strug-
gling with new foreclosures and high loan losses. Just imagine 
how much worse off Wells Fargo would be today if it had held 
only $30.1 billion in capital, as calculated using the Basel II for-
mula for required capital. This picture would have been the same 
for virtually all banks that would have adopted Basel II prior to the 
economic crisis. All of these BHCs would have run out of capital 
much sooner than they actually did. The complete statistics for 
capital held against loans and leases, total capital, and risk-weight-
ed assets for all 11 BHCs are presented in Tables 3 through 5 at the 
end of this paper.
Conclusions
 The second Basel Accord was intended to promote a more 
forward-looking approach to capital supervision, one that would 
encourage banks to identify the risks they may face, today and in 
the future, and to develop or improve their ability to manage those 
risks. Despite this intent, Basel II definitely has major flaws. The 
main flaw is its reliance on historical data in determining a BHC’s 
level of credit risk. The present study shows without question that 
Basel II needs to be adjusted to be more conservative. Although 
there is nothing inherently wrong in financial institutions’ want-
ing to hold a minimum amount of capital and not one cent more 
than needed, it does leave the banking industry more vulnerable in 
times of economic downturn, as the past several years have shown. 
Fortunately, now that history has clearly demonstrated that there 
is more risk than previously thought, the implementation of Basel 
II is somewhat self-correcting. The key internal estimates made by 
each BHC will be altered to be more conservative, thus hopefully 
providing a safer financial position for the banking industry in the 
years to come. Nevertheless, a portion of the change should come 
from changes to the Basel Accord and its formulas. Indeed, regula-
tors are currently preparing what some are calling “Basel III” to be 
released by year-end 2010. (BIS, 2009.)
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218,521,21 .cnI ,sknaB tsurTnuS 6,964,409 -42.57%
 Taunus Corporation -1,287,955 1,450,179 -212.60%
331,835,61 procnaB SU 7,636,451 -53.83%
Wachovia Corporation 34,867,305 20,072,791 -42.43%
314,481,73 ynapmoC & ograF slleW 15,845,438 -57.39%
055,972,123 latoT 151,277,443
Equally weighted percent change in capital -68.70%
Weighted average percent change in capital -52.91%
 Actual Capital 
Hypothetical Basel II 
Capital Percent Change 
Bank of America Corporation 125,225,775 91,935,999 -26.58% 
Barclays Group US, Inc. 3,491,551 2,492,021 -28.63% 
 %78.92- 763,744,68 000,062,321 .cnI puorgitiC
Countrywide Financial Corporation 17,031,228 11,682,430 -31.41% 
HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. 38,338,644 21,830,448 -43.06% 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 115,265,000 85,680,264 -25.67% 
,81 .cnI ,sknaB tsurTnuS 024,866 12,863,463 -28.63% 
 Taunus Corporation -3,776,000 -1,037,865 -72.51% 
000,594,42 procnaB SU  15,593,318 -36.34% 
Wachovia Corporation 60,194,000 45,399,487 -24.58% 
,15 ynapmoC & ograF slleW 427,000 30,088,025 -41.49% 
   759,479,204 460,779,275 latoT
    
Equally weighted percent change in capital 
Weighted average percent change in capital 
-35.34% 
-29.67% 
    
Actual Risk-
Weighted Assets 
Hypothetical Basel II 
Risk-Weighted 
Assets 
Hypothetical Risk-
Weighted Assets @ 
8% RBC 
Bank of America Corporation 560,812,349 280,595,381 416,684,141 
Barclays Group US, Inc. 15,097,947 6,376,043 9,133,681
,212,485 .cnI ,puorgitiC 300 268,224,032 390,601,247 
Countrywide Financial Corporation 63,885,430 22,097,947 35,356,716
HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. 245,561,518 97,373,047 135,591,968 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 405,060,800 164,924,958 253,984,435
,901 .cnI ,sknaB tsurTnuS 143,221 62,685,948 87,055,111 
 Taunus Corporation 33,280,500 -37,472,332 18,127,241
007,364,131 procnaB SU  60,703,110 95,455,640 
Wachovia Corporation 307,743,200 177,164,972 250,909,892
Wells Fargo & Company 297,475,300 126,763,501 198,067,970 
,1 562,637,357,2 latoT 229,436,608 1,890,968,043 
    
Weighted average percent change in RWA -55.35% -31.33% 
Table 3.  Capital Held Against Loans & Leases ($000s)
Table 5.  Risk-Weighted Assets of Loans and Leases ($000s)
Table 4.  Total Capital ($000s)
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Mentor comments: Dr. Tim Yeager has nothing but praise for 
Bart Simmons’ independence and planning in executing this im-
portant piece of research.
In October 2008, the largest U.S. banks such as Citigroup and 
Bank of America were on the brink of failure threatening to 
pull the economy into a full-blown depression. Just a few years 
before, regulators were so impressed with the health and stabil-
ity of the banking system that they began a process called Basel 
II to reduce the amount of capital banks were required to hold to 
protect against failure. The implementation process dragged on 
for several years so that, even now in 2010, Basel II has never 
been put into effect. Had Basel II been in place on the eve of the 
financial crisis, how much less capital might banks have held, and 
consequently, how much worse might the crisis have been? Bart 
Simmons was an undergraduate Finance and Accounting major 
in my advanced banking course when we discussed Basel II. He 
immediately identified this as a research topic that was difficult 
and complicated enough to interest him, and he approached me 
about doing his thesis on this important topic. I don’t know of any 
other research by students or professors alike that explores this 
issue. Like most students, Bart set aggressive deadlines for work-
ing on his project. Unlike most students, he met or exceeded those 
deadlines.  Bart worked independently on his research, including 
making his way through complex statistical formulas. With little 
guidance from me, he constructed and completed his empirical 
tests. When it came time for writing up the results, Bart put to-
gether a draft of which many of my PhD students would be proud. 
I worked with him to polish up the rough edges, but he had clearly 
articulated his research question and methodology, and described 
the results. Bart found that procrastination does indeed pay some-
times because delays in implementing Basel II allowed the banking 
system to have more capital than it would have had otherwise. 
Bart also knows that procrastination does not pay when it comes 
to conducting thorough and high-quality research.  He proved that 
as well with his timely and diligent efforts on this important topic.
102  inquiry  Volume 11 2010
6
Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 11 [2010], Art. 16
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol11/iss1/16
